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Qureshi: California's Fetal Murder Statute

NOTE

PEOPLE v. DAVIS: CALIFORNIA'S MURDER
STATUTE AND THE REQUIREMENT OF
VIABILITY FOR FETAL MURDER
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Davis, 1 the California Supreme Court held
that the viabilitr of a fetus is not required for a murder conviction under California Penal Code section 187(a).3 The Davis
court ruled that the third-party killing of a fetus with malice
aforethought is murder under California's murder statute so
long as the state can show that the fetus has progressed beyond the embryonic stage of seven to eight weeks.4 This decision overturned eighteen years of California appellate court
holdings. 5

1. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994) (per Lucas, C.J., joined by
Arabian, J.; Kennard, J., concurring, joined by Stone, J.; Baxter, J., concurring and
dissenting, joined by George, J.; Mosk, J., dissenting).
2. "Viability is that stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn
child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial lifesupportive systems." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1565-66 (6th ed. 1990). See infra
notes 15 and accompanying text for the United States Supreme Court's definition
of viability.
3. Davis, 872 P.2d at 593. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988) reads:
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being or fetus with malice aforethought." [d.
4. Davis, 872 P.2d at 602.
5. [d. at 601. Since People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Ct. App. 1976),
every California appellate court that addressed the issue of whether viability is required to constitute murder, required fetal viability. See infra notes 17-26 and
accompanying text for a historical discussion of the judicial interpretation of §
187(a) prior to Davis.

579
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II. BACKGROUND

In 1970, California's murder statute, codified in Penal
Code section 187, read: "Murder is the unlawful killing of a
human being with malice aforethought."6 The same year, in
Keeler v. Superior Court,7 the California Supreme Court held
that a man who killed a fetus carried by his former wife could
not be prosecuted for murder. s The Keeler court reasoned that
the legislature probably intended the phrase ''human being" to
mean a person who had been born alive. 9
Although the legislative session was more than halfway
over, and the deadline for introducing new bills had passed,
the majority floor leader of the Assembly took immediate action to permit the legislature to overrule Keeler.10 Thus, the
legislature amended Penal Code section 187(a) by adding within the proscription of the statute the killing of a fetus. l l The
amended statute now reads: "Murder is the unlawful killing of
a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought."12
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988) (emphasis added).
7. 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
8. Id. at 618.
9. Id. at 622. In Keeler, Teresa and Robert Keeler were divorced. Id. at 618.
At the time of the divorce, Teresa was already pregnant by Ernest Vogt. Id. Five
months later, Robert came upon Teresa driving on a rural road. Robert said, "I
hear you're pregnant." Id. When he looked at her stomach, he became outraged
and said, "I'm going to stomp it out of you." Id. He then hit Teresa in the face
and pushed his knee into her stomach. Id. Teresa survived, but the fetus was
stillborn. Id. Doctors concluded that if the fetus was born at the time of the incident, it would have had a 75% to 96% chance of survival. Id. at 619.
10. See People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 608 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., dissenting)
Justice Mosk states:
[AI fellow legislator relinquished sponsorship of a pending
bill on a wholly different subject-Assembly Bill No.
81S-and on June 24 the majority leader "amended" that
bill by deleting its original text in its entirety and replacing it with his new version of section 187. In quick succession the bill was then amended twice more in the
Assembly (July 10 & 17), passed and sent to the Senate
(July 27), amended in the Senate (Aug. 7), and passed
and returned to the Assembly (Aug. 20), where the Senate
amendments were concurred in the next day (Aug. 21).
Id. (quoting Comment, Is the Intentional Killing of an Unborn Child Homicide?, 2
PACIFIC L.J. 170, 174 (1970».
11. See Stats. 1970, ch. 1311, § I, p. 2440.
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988) (emphasis added). Despite the addition of the term "fetus," the amended statute states that it does not apply to abor-
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In its 1973 opinion in Roe v. Wade,;3 the United States
Supreme Court held that, in the context of a mother's decision
to have an abortion, the state has no legitimate interest in
protecting the fetus until it reaches the point of viability.l4
The Court explained that viability occurs when the fetus reaches the capability of meaningful life outside of the mother's
womb. 15
After Roe, a number of California appellate courts construed the term "fetus" in section 187(a), to mean a "viable
fetus. ,,16 In People v. Smith,17 the first of these cases, the
court of appeal held that viability is an essential element of
fetal murder under section 187(a).18 The Smith court reasoned
that "one cannot destroy independent human life prior to the
time it has come into existence."19 Thus, the court maintained, before viability, the state has no interest in protecting
the fetus from abortion. 20
The Smith court relied on Roe v. Wade in acknowledging a
woman's constitutional right to abort her fetus before viabili-

tiona complying with the Therapeutic Abortion Act, performed by a doctor when
the death of the mother was substantially certain in the absence of an abortion,
or whenever the mother solicited, aided, and otherwise chose to abort the fetus.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(b) (West Supp. 1971).
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
15. 1d. The Court stated that "viability" generally occurs at approximately 28
weeks, but may occur as early as 24 weeks. 1d. at 160. At the point of viability,
the Court ruled, the state may restrict abortion. 1d. at 163.
16. See, e.g., People v. Hamilton, 774 P.2d 730 (Cal. 1989); People v.
Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Ct. App. 1990); People v. R.P. Smith, 234 Cal.
Rptr. 142 (Ct. App. 1987); People v. Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. 830 (Ct. App. 1978);
People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Ct. App. 1976).
17. 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Ct. App. 1976).
18. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 504. In Smith, the defendant beat his wife who
was 12 to 15 weeks pregnant, saying he did not want the baby to live. 1d. at 500.
His wife miscarried her fetus as a direct result of the beating. 1d. At trial, the
parties stipulated that the fetus was not viable at the time of the miscarriage. 1d.
The trial court then dismissed the murder charge, holding that viability is an
essential element. 1d. The court of appeal affirmed a trial court's ruling dismissing the murder charge and held that viability is an essential element under §
187(a). 1d. at 504.
19. 1d. at 502
20. 1d.
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ty.21 The court explained that:
Implicit in Wade is the conclusion that as a
matter of Constitutional law the destruction of a
nonviable fetus is not a taking of a human life.
It follows that such destruction cannot constitute murder or other form of homicide, whether
committed by a mother, a father ... or a third
person. 22

Since Smith, subsequent cases have similarly interpreted
California's feticide statute as requiring a viability limitation. 23 In 1990, the court of appeal in People v. Henderson 24
recognized that, even though the statute does not expressly
refer~nce viability, decisional law interpreting section 187(a),
has limited "criminal liability for its violation to viable fetuses.,,25 The Henderson court considered the definition of fetal
viability to be well-established and concluded that fetal viability occurs when the fetus is capable of independent existence
outside the mother's womb. 26
Despite the appellate court decisions inferring a viability
requirement to convict a defendant of fetal murder under section 187(a), the California Supreme Court had never addressed
this issue before People v. Davis. 27
21. 1d.
22. 1d. at 502. The court defined viability as "having attained such form and
development of organs as to be normally capable of living outside the uterus." 1d.
at 503 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DIeT. 2548 (3d ed. 1966).
23. See, e.g., People v. Apodaca, 142 Cal. Rptr. 830 (Ct. App. 1978) (rejecting
the assertion that § 187(a) is unconstitutionally vague because it does not specify
the stage of development of the fetus in the statute); People v. R.P. Smith, 234
Cal. Rptr. 142 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that viability of a fetus is a constitutional
prerequisite for murder of a fetus by extension of Roe).
24. 275 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Ct. App. 1990).
25. See id. at 854.
26. See id. at 853.
27. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 597. In People v. Hamilton, 774 P.2d 730 (Cal.
1989), the California Supreme Court did not consider whether §187(a) should impose criminal liability for only the killing of viable fetuses. Hamilton, 774 P.2d at
747. The defendant there was convicted of the murder of his wife and 7-month old
fetus. 1d. at 733. On appeal, the defendant asserted that the trial court's jury
instruction was incorrect and that it misled the jury to believe they could convict
him if the baby could be born alive. 1d. at 747. The California Supreme Court determined that it did not need to address the d~fendant's contention because there
was uncontradicted evidence that the fetus was viable under any definition of viability; thus, even if the instructional error had occurred, the defendant could not
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III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 1, 1991, Maria Flores went to cash her welfare
check at a check cashing store with her twenty-month-old son,
Hector.28 At the time, she was twenty-three to twenty-five
weeks pregnant. 29 As Flores left the store, defendant Robert
Davis pulled a gun and demanded the money from Flores'
purse. 30 When Flores refused to give Davis her purse, Davis
shot her in the chest and fled the scene. 31
Flores underwent emergency surgery as a result of the
shooting, but the next day, her fetus was stillborn as a direct
result of her blood loss, low blood pressure, and state of
shock. 32 The police subsequently apprehended Davis and
charged him with assault and robbery of Flores and the murder of her fetus. 33 Moreover, the prosecution charged the special circumstance ofrobbery-murder. 34
The trial court instructed the jury that it had to find
Flores' fetus was viable before it could convict Davis of murder. 35 The jury then convicted Davis of murder of a fetus dur-

have been prejudiced. Id.
28. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 593 (Cal. 1994).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. During Flores' surgery, although doctors sutured the existing holes in
her uterine wall to prevent additional bleeding, no further obstetrical measures
were taken due to the immaturity of her fetus. Id. At trial, the prosecution's medical experts testified that the fetus's statistical chances of survival outside the
womb were between 7 and 47 percent. Id. The defense medical expert, however,
stated the chances were only 2 or 3 percent. Id. None of the experts testified that
the survival of the fetus was probable. Id.
33. Davis, 872 P.2d at 593.
34. Id. When a murder occurs during the commission of a state listed felony,
the defendant may be charged with murder with special circumstances. If the defendant is convicted, the result may be the death penalty. See CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.2(a) (West 1988).
35. Davis, 872 P.2d at 593. California Penal Code §187(a) does not expressly
require viability as an element of fetal murder, but the trial court based its instructions on prior court of appeal jury instructions requiring the viability of a
ietus for a fetal murder conviction. See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text
for a discussion of these prior cases.
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ing the course of a robbery,36 assault with a firearm,37 and
robbery.3s Furthermore, the jury found true the special circumstance allegation. 39
On appeal, Davis argued that the trial court prejudicially
erred by not giving California's standard viability instruction. 40 Specifically, Davis argued, the trial court should have
defined viability as "probability of survival" instead of the
lower threshold "possibility of survival. 1141
Rather than simply examining Davis' alleged viability
instructional error, however, the court of appeal proceeded to
address the state's contention that viability is not necessary to
convict a defendant of fetal murder. 42 The court then agreed
with the state and, contrary to prior decisions, held that viability is not a required element of fetal murder under section
187(a).43 Nevertheless, the court of appeal reversed Davis'
murder conviction and set aside the special circumstance finding. 44 The court believed that application of its unprecedented
interpretation of the parental consent statute to Davis would
violate his due process rights. 45

36. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988); see also CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.2(a)(2) (West 1988).
37. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a)(2) (West Supp. 1990) (amended 1995).
38. Davis, 872 P.2d at 593. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 211 (West 1988).
39. [d. Although the jury found true the special circumstance allegation, the
prosecutor did not seek the death penalty. Consequently, Davis was sentenced to
life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus five years for the use of a firearm. [d.
40. [d. The standard jury instruction, CALJIC No. 8.10 (5th ed. 1988), provides: "A viable human fetus is one that has attained such form and development
of organs as to be normally capable of living outside of the uterus." [d.
41. [d. CALJIC No. 8.10 prevents the jury from convicting a defendant of fetal
murder unless there is a "probability" of the fetus' survival. Rather than giving
the standard viability instruction, CALJIC No. 8.10, the trial court instead gave
the jury an instruction that allowed it to convict the defendant if it found that the
fetus had a possibility of survival. Davis, 872 P.2d at 593.
The trial court's jury instruction stated: "Within the meaning of Penal Code
section 187, subdivision (a), as charged in Count One, a fetus is viable when it
has achieved the capability for independent existence; that is, when it is possible
for it to survive the trauma of birth, although with artificial medical aid." Davis,
872 P.2d at 593.
42. Davis, 872 P.2d at 594.
43. [d.
44. [d.
45. [d.
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In a 6-1 decision on the viability issue and a 4-3 decision
to remand because of due process considerations, the California
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal judgment in its
entirety.46
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
. Initially, in People v. Davis,47 the California Supreme
Court discussed in depth the historical development of
California's feticide statute. 46 The court then performed its
own statutory interpretation and concluded that fetal viability
is not a required element to convict a defendant of murder
under the statute.49 Finally, the Davis court discussed Robert
Davis' due process challenge and analyzed whether the trial
court's instructional error was prejudicial. 50

A. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF THE CALIFORNIA MURDER
STATUTE

After discussing prior appellate court decisions that had
inferred a viability requirement as an element of fetal murder,51 the California Supreme Court emphasized that it had
never determined whether such an element is necessary.52
The Davis court then embarked upon its own statutory interpretation of California's murder statute. 53 The Davis court
began its analysis with a discussion of Roe v. Wade 54 principles. 55

46. [d.

47. 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994).
48. See id. at 594-97. The Background section of this Note is an abbreviation
of the Davis court's "Historical Background" section of its opinion. See supra notes
6-26 and accompanying text for the author's summary of the California Supreme
Court's discussion.
49. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 599-600. See infra notes 51-96 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Davis court's statutory interpretation.
50. See id. at 600-02. See infra notes 97-108 and accompanying text for a discussion on the due process challenge and instructional error.
51. See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
decisions.
52. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 597.
53. See id. at 597-600.
54. 410 U.s. 113 (1973).
55. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 597.
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Roe v. Wade Principles Do Not Apply

The Davis court commenced its Roe v. Wade analysis by
announcing that Roe principles are inapplicable to a statute
that criminalizes the killing of a fetus without the mother's
consent. 56 The court explained that Roe did not rule that the
state's interest becomes legitimate only after viability. 57 Rather, the Roe decision "forbids the state's protection of the
unborn's interest only when these interests conflict with the
constitutional rights of the prospective parent."58 Thus, the
Davis court maintained, despite Roe v. Wade and its progeny, a
court may recognize an unborn fetus' interests in situations
where these interests do not conflict with the mother's right to

56. See id. Davis claimed that the fetus did not obtain the protection of Penal
Code § 187{a) because the fetus could have been legally aborted at the time it
was killed. See id. Davis relied on Smith and its progeny to assert that, if the
fetus had not attained independent human life status under Roe, it had not
achieved "viability" under Smith, and therefore, he could not be prosecuted under
PENAL CODE § 187{a) for the fetus's murder. See id. See supra notes 17-26 for a
discussion of Smith and its progeny.
57. [d. See also Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting
the Potentiality of Human Life 22 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 97, 144 (1985). Professor
Parness states: "By holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not cover the
unborn, the Supreme Court was left with only one constitutionally mandated right,
that of the mother's privacy, to be considered along with the legitimate state interest in protecting an unborn's potential life." [d.
58. Davis, 872 P.2d at 597. Parness, supra note 57, at 144. Other scholars
agree with Professor Parness. See, e.g., King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A
Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647 (1979). See
also Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Born Alive Rule and Other
Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 563, 616 (1987). Professor Forsythe explains:
"While the decision in Roe declares that the state may
not protect the potential life of a fetus from the moment
of conception, it does so in the narrow context of the
mother's abortion decision." Under Roe v. Wade, therefore,
the right to an abortion is encompassed within the
woman's right to constitutional privacy. The fetus is not a
'person' for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment
and has no Constitutional rights that would outweigh the
exercise of the woman's Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The fetus' rights and the state's interest, or lack of interest, in protecting maternal health and in protecting the
life of the fetus, were distinctly balanced against the
woman's right to privacy in the context of consensual
abortion.
[d. (quoting Parness, supra note 57, at 97).
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personal autonomy. 59 The court stated that, "when the state's
interest in protecting the potential life of a fetus is not counterbalanced against a mother's privacy right to an abortion, or
other equivalent interest, the state's interest should prevail. 1>60
2.

Viability Is Not a Requirement in Other States

Having determined that Roe principles do not require a
fetal viability element to convict a defendant of fetal murder,
the Davis court next examined other states' statutes which do
not require viability to convict a defendant of feticide. sl Specifically, the Davis court focused on Minnesota and Illinois,
where constitutional challenges to fetal murder statutes have
failed. 62 In those states, the challenges were based on the
statutes' failure to distinguish between viable and nonviable
fetuses. s3
a.

Minnesota: State v. Merrill

In 1990, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed equal
protection and due process challenges to the state's feticide
statute64 by a defendant who murdered a woman and her

59. Davis,. 872 P.2d at 597.
60. Id.
61. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 598-99. The court cited Minnesota, Arizona, Illinois,
Louisiana, Indiana, North Dakota and Utah as states that do not require fetal viability to convict a defendant of murder. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103
(A)(5) (1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.2, 9-2.1, 9-3.2 (1991) (currently
found at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720 para. 5/9-1.2, -2.1. -3.2 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (Burns 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:2(7), § 14:32.5-:32.8
(West 1986 & Supp. 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17.1-01 to 12.1-17.1-04 (Supp.
1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (1990).
62. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 598-99. Minnesota and Illinois courts rejected constitutional challenges to their respective state statutes on the ground that "protection of a woman's privacy interest in the abortion context is not applicable to a
nonconsensual murder of the unborn child." Id. at 598.
63. Id.
64. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2661(1) (West 1987). The statute includes in its
definition of first degree murder the killing "of an unborn child with premeditation
and with intent to effect the death of the unborn child or of another." Id.
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four-week-old embryo.65 In State v. Merrill,66 the defendant
argued that the Minnesota feticide statute violated constitutional principles due to its failure to distinguish between viable
and nonviable fetuses. 67
The defendant in Merrill asserted that the Minnesota
statute violated equal protection principles because, by not
requiring viability as an element for fetal murder, the statute
exposed him to serious penal consequences. 68 To the contrary,
the defendant pointed out, mothers and doctors who deliberately terminate nonviable fetuses are not subject to criminal sanctions. 69 In short, the defendant argued that similarly situated
persons were treated disparately by the statute. 70
In rejecting the defendant's equal protection challenge, the
Merrill court found that a defendant who assaults a woman
and destroys her fetus without her consent is not the same as
a woman who elects to terminate her pregnancy legally.71
The court explained that, "in the case of abortion, the woman's
choice and the doctor's actions are based on the woman's constitutionally protected right to privacy.,,72 The court further
stated: "Roe v. Wade protects the woman's right of choice; it
does not protect, much less confer on an assailant, a thirdparty unilateral right to destroy the fetus."73 Accordingly, the
Merrill court concluded, the Minnesota feticide statute does not
violate equal protection principles by failing to distinguish
between viable and nonviable fetuses. 74
65. See State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990).
66. [d.
67. [d. at 321.
68. [d.
69. [d.

70. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 321.
71. [d. at 321-22.
72. [d. at 322. The Merrill court articulated that the right to privacy includes
the woman's choice to terminate or continue the pregnancy without state interference unless the state's interest in protecting the potentiality of human life becomes compelling. [d.
73. [d.
74. [d. The defendant also asserted that feticide statute violated equal protection because an unborn is not a "person" under Roe and is not protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. [d. The Merrill court rejected this assertion and reasoned
that the state's feticide statute protects the potentiality of human life without
directly or indirectly impinging on the mother's privacy rights. [d. The court explained that Roe focused on protecting the woman from governmental interference
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The defendant in Merrill also claimed that Minnesota's
feticide statute75 is so vague that it violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 76 Specifically, the defendant asserted that the statute fails to give fair warning of
the prohibited conduct. 77
The Mer-rill court rejected the due process argument, explaining that the "fair warning" rule has never been interpreted to excuse criminal liability because the actual victim was
not the one that a defendant originally intended to assault. 7S
The court explained that there is always a possibility that a
female victim of childbearing years might be pregnant. 79
Thus, the Merrill court concluded, Minnesota's feticide statute
provides the requisite fair warning. so
b.

Illinois: People v. Ford

Additionally, the Davis court examined an lllinois opinion
which relied substantially on Merrill.s1 As in Merrill, the lllinois Court of Appeal in People v. Ford s2 addressed assertions
that the state's feticide statuteS3 violates equal protection and
and acknowledged that the state still has a legitimate interest in protecting the
potentiality of human life. [d. Consequently, the state retains an interest in protecting an unborn child whether the embryo is viable or not. [d. The court concluded that even laws which directly impact abortion are constitutional so long as
the statute itself does not unduly impinge on the woman's decision. [d.
75. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2661(1).
76. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 322.
77. [d. at 323. The Merrill court noted the defendant argued that it is unfair
to impose on the murderer of a woman an additional penalty for murder of her
unborn child when neither the assailant nor the pregnant woman may have been
aware of the pregnancy. 1d.
78. 1d. The court noted that just because a perpetrator did not intend to kill a
specific victim does not mean he lacked a fair warning that he would be held
similarly accountable as if the victim had been the one intended. [d.
79. [d.
80. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 323.
81. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 598-99.
82. 581 N.E.2d 1189, 1197 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). In Ford, the defendant was
convicted under the Illinois feticide statute for killing his 17-year-old stepdaughter's five and one half-month old fetus. 1d. at 1190.
83. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.1 (1985) (current version at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/9-1.2 (Smith-Hurd 1993». The statute states: "A person commits the offense of intentional homicide of an unborn child if . . . he [or shel . . .
(1) either intended to cause the death of or to do great bodily harm to the preg-
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due process principles for failing to distinguish between viable
and nonviable fetuses. 84
Upon determination that the Illinois feticide statute did
not affect any protectable interest held by the defendant, the
Ford court applied a rational basis standard of review to the
defendant's equal protection challenge. s5 To pass constitutional muster, the state's feticide statute needed only a rational
relation to a valid legislative purpose. 88 Because it found that
the feticide statute bears a rational relationship to the valid
legislative purpose of protecting the potentiality of human life,
the Ford court concluded that the statute does not violate
equal protection principles. s7 After dispensing of the
nant woman or her unborn child . . . (2) he knew that his acts created a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm to the pregnant woman or her unborn
child: and (3) he knew that she was pregnant . . . . " [d. (emphasis added).
84. See Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189. The defendant argued that Illinois' feticide
statute violates equal protection principles because under Roe, a woman can terminate her nonviable fetus without incurring serious penalties. [d. To the contrary,
the defendant pointed out, by destroying a nonviable fetus, the defendant faced
capital penalties. [d. Consequently, the defendant argued that he and a pregnant
woman are similarly situated, but treated differently by the statute. [d.
The defendant's argument in Ford was identical to the argument made by
the defendant in State v. Merrill. See supra notes 64-80 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Merrill.
85. Ford, 581 N.E.2d at 1200. The court stated:
The court must first determine the proper level of scrutiny to be applied to the challenged classification. When
the statute under consideration affects a fundamental
right, or discriminates against a suspect class, courts will
apply a strict scrutiny test and only uphold it if it serves
a compelling State interest. If neither a fundamental right
nor a suspect class is affected by this statute, a rational
basis test is used. Under this analysis, a statutory classification must bear a rational relationship to a valid legislative purpose. The classification created by the statute
will only be declared violative of the equal protection
clause if based on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit
of a legitimate State goal.
[d. at 1199-1200.
86. [d. at 1200.
87. [d. The court noted:
[AI pregnant woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy and the defendant who assaults a pregnant woman,
causing the death of her fetus, are not similarly situated.
A woman consents to the abortion and has an absolute
right, at least during the first trimester of the pregnancy,
to choose to terminate the pregnancy. A woman has a
privacy interest in terminating her pregnancy; however,
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defendant's equal protection argument, the Ford court then
rejected the defendant's due process challenge as well. 88
3.

Conclusion of the Davis Majority

The Davis court utilized both Ford and Merrill to illustrate
the constitutionality of criminalizing the killing of a nonviable
fetus and the legislature's freedom to impose upon the killer of
a fetus the same penalty as is prescribed for the murder of a
human being.89 The Davis court reasoned that, like Minnesota
and Illinois, California is a "code state,"90 thus the legislature
"has the exclusive province to define by statute what acts constitute a crime. "91 The court concluded that nothing prevents
the legislature from protecting the potentiality of human life;
"when the mother's privacy interests are not involved, the legislature may determine whether, and at what point, it should
protect life inside a mother's womb from homicide."92
Consequently, the Davis court held that viability is not an
element of fetal murder under section 187(a).93 The court interpreted the legislative history as suggesting that the term
"fetus" was deliberately left undefined in the face of divided
legislative views about its meaning. 94 Nevertheless, the court
defendant has no such interest. The statute simply pro·
tects the mother and the unborn child from the intention·
al wrongdoing of a third party.
ld. at 1199.

88. See id. at 1200·01. As in State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990),
the defendant argued that the feticide statute violates due process principles be·
cause it is unconstitutionally vague. See supra notes 64·80 and accompanying text
for the discussion of Merrill. The Ford court ruled that the defendant did not have
standing to challenge the statute on vagueness grounds. See Ford, 581 N.E.2d at
1201. Nevertheless, the court added, even if the defendant had standing to chal·
lenge the statute, the fetal homicide statute is not unconstitutionally vague. ld.
The Ford court reasoned that the statute only requires proof that the entity exist·
ing in the mother's womb was alive, but is now dead as a result of defendant's
actions. ld.
89. Davis, 872 P.2d at 599.
90. The term "code state" refers to the legislature's exclusive province to define
statutorily what acts constitute a crime. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 6 (West 1988).
91. Davis, 872 P.2d at 599.
92.ld.
93. ld.
94. ld. The court believed that the legislature purposely left the term "fetus"
undefined after debate on the subject. ld. The court stated: "The Legislature was
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explained, the term "fetus" is generally defined as "the unborn
offspring in the postembryonic period, after major structures
have been outlined."95 Because this period occurs in humans
seven to eight weeks after fertilization, the court concluded
that the killing of a fetus with malice aforethought by a third
party is murder so long as the state can show that the fetus
has progressed beyond the seven to eight week embryonic
stage. 96
B. VIABILITY MAy NOT BE REQUIRED TO CONVICT A
DEFENDANT OF FETAL MURDER, BUT THE CASE MUST STILL
BE REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL

Although the Davis majority held that fetal viability is not
a required element to convict a defendant of fetal murder, it
agreed with the court of appeal that this new statutory interpretation was a major change in the law that judicially enlarged the statute. 97 Prior to this case, appellate courts had
always read a viability requirement into California's feticide
statute. 98 Thus, the court could not apply this new interpretation to Robert Davis because it would violate his due process
rights. 99 To hold a defendant criminally responsible for conduct that he could not reasonably anticipate would be proscribed would violate due process principles: "[T]he law must
give sufficient warning that individuals 'may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden.,,,loo Accordingly,
the Davis court concluded that its new interpretation of
clearly aware that it could have limited the term 'fetus' to 'viable fetus,' for it specifically rejected a proposed amendment that required the fetus be at least 20
weeks in gestation before the statute would apply." [d. at 594.
95. [d. at 599 (quoting SWANE-DORLAND ANN. MEDICAL-LEGAL DICT. 281
(1987».
96. Davis, 872 P.2d at 599. The court's holding overruled Smith and its progeny. See supra notes 17-27 for a discussion those cases.
97. Davis, 872 P.2d at 600.
98. [d. See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text for a historical discussion
of these cases.
99. Davis, 872 P.2d at 600. The court explained that prior appellate court
holdings demonstrated that a viability requirement had been consistently read into
§ 187(a). [d. Consequently, the elimination of this requirement created an
unforeseeable enlargement of a criminal statute. [d. Thus, the new interpretation
of the statute should apply prospectively only. [d. The Davis court also noted that
in this case it was not faced with reevaluating its own precedent. [d.
100. [d. (quoting Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975».
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California's feticide statute should apply only prospectively.101
Because it could not administer its new interpretation of
Penal Code section 187(a), to Robert Davis, the supreme court
was forced to use the former interpretation of the statute;102
yet, the trial court had given the jury a modified version of the
former instruction. lOS Thus, the Davis court first had to consider whether the trial court erred in giving the modified jury
instruction, and if so, whether the error prejudiced Robert Davis. 104
Because the trial court's instruction permitted the jury to
convict Robert Davis of fetal murder if the fetus merely had a
"possibility" of survival, rather than the formerly proper standard requiring that the fetus have a "probability" of survival,
the Davis court found that the trial court erred in instructing
the jury.105 Moreover, the court explained, the error prejudiced Robert Davis. By substantially lowering the viability
threshold as commonly understood and accepted, the instruction allowed the jury to find viability at an incorrect stage of
fetal development. 106 The court explained: "Had the jury been
given [the proper instruction at the time], it is reasonably
probable it would have found the fetus not viable."107 Thus,
the Davis court concluded, Robert Davis' conviction must be

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

[d. at 600.
See id. at 601.
See id.
See Davis, 872 P.2d at 601.
See id. The court observed:
[T]he wording of CAWIC No. 8.10, defining viability as
"normally capable of living outside the uterus," while not
a model of clarity, suggests a better than even chance-a
probability-that a fetus will survive if born at that particular point in time. By contrast, the instruction given
below suggests a "possibility" of survival, and essentially
amounts to a finding that a fetus incapable of survival
outside the womb for any discernible time would nonetheless be considered "viable" within the meaning of section
187, subdivision (a).
[d. at 602.
106. [d.
107. Davis, 872 P.2d at 602. Davis' medical expert stated that it was "possible"
for the fetus to have survived, but that the chances were 2 or 3 percent. [d. None
of the medical experts who testified at the trial believed the fetus had a probable
chance of survival. [d.
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reversed, and the case must be remanded for a new tria1. 108
V. CONCURRENCE
Justice Kennard agreed with the Davis majority l09 that
the legislature did not intend to make viability an element of
fetal murder. no Additionally, Justice Kennard agreed that
the United States Constitution does not prohibit a state from
criminalizing the unlawful killing of a nonviable fetus. 111
Nevertheless, she wrote separately to address the dissent and
to expand on the majority's discussion of Roe v. Wade. ll2
A.

LEGISLATIVE INACTION IN THE FACE OF A JUDICIALLY
IMPOSED VIABILITY REQUIREMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
ACQUIESCENCE

Contrary to the dissent,113 Justice Kennard believed that
there was no significance to the legislature's failure to rewrite
the fetal murder statute in response to the appellate court
decisions interpreting a viability element in the statute. U4
Thus, she did not share the dissent's view that this legislative
inaction implied an agreement with these decisions.ll5
Justice Kennard pointed out that legislative inaction
would only be significant if the legislature could have nullified
the rule adopted by the courts of appeal; here, however, the
legislature was powerless to eliminate the requirement of fetal
viability even had it so desired. u6 Justice Kennard reasoned
that the legislature's restraint stemmed from previous appellate court decisions that interpreted the viability requirement
for fetal murder as a matter of constitutional law. 117
108. ld.
109. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994) (per Kennard, J., concurring,
joined by Stone, J.).
110. See id. at 603
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 607·24 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See infra notes 135·97 and ac·
companying text for the author's discussion of Justice Mosk's dissent.
114. Davis, 872 P.2d at 603.
115. ld.
116. ld.
117. ld. Justice Kennard explained: "Faced with that appellate authority, the
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B. THE STATE'S POWER TO CRIMINALIZE THE KILLING OF A
FETUS DOES NOT DEPEND ON FETAL VIABILITY

Justice Kennard stated that prior appellate court decisions
had erroneously relied on Roe v. Wad e1l8 when they read a
viability requirement into the fetal murder statute.1l9 She believed that these courts had confused the issue of state authority to interfere with a woman's right to choose an abortion,
with the state's interest in punishing a third party whose conduct deprives a woman of her right to choose. 12o Justice
Kennard explained: " [W]hen, as here, a violent assault on a
pregnant woman results in the killing of the fetus she carries,
the state's power to criminalize the act as murder does not
depend on 'fetal viability."H21
C.

IN SOME INSTANCES THE NEW STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
COULD RESULT IN CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PuNISHMENT

Although Justice Kennard joined the majority's conclusion
that fetal viability is not necessary to convict a defendant of
fetal murder, she believed the dissent raised a significant concern regarding the death penalty issue. 122 Justice Kennard

legislature's inaction proves nothing more than its recognition that, under California case law, enforcement of section 187, subdivision (a), against someone who had
killed a nonviable fetus would be unconstitutional." [d.
118. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
119. Davis, 872 P.2d at 603.
120. [d. Justice Kennard stated:
Although in Roe the concept of "fetal viability" was critical to the first of the two issues, it has no application to
California's fetal murder statute . . . Because, unlike the
situation in Roe v. Wade . . . there is no competing constitutionally protected interest at stake, the state's decision to criminalize the conduct can be justified even if the
state does not have a compelling interest in protecting
potential human life.
[d. at 603-04.
121. [d. at 604. Justice Kennard added: "[W]hen a fetus dies as the result of a
criminal assault on a pregnant woman, the state's interest extends beyond the
protection of potential human life. The state has an interest in punishing violent
conduct that deprives a pregnant woman of her procreative choice." [d.
122. [d. at 604. See also id. at 615-20 for dissent's discussion regarding the possibly unconstitutional circumstances. See infra notes 171-84 and accompanying text
for the author's summary of Justice Mosk's discussion on this issue.
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agreed with the dissent that the majority's new interpretation
of California's murder statute could potentially result in violations of the constitutional proscriptions against cruel and unusual punishment. 123 She pointed out that under California's
felony-murder rule,124 this new· interpretation could lead to
the imposition of the death penalty even if a convicted
defendant's conduct is inadvertent. 125
In Robert Davis' situation, however, Justice Kennard felt
that the trial court's sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole was not wholly disproportionate to his
criminal culpability.126 Nevertheless, she agreed with the majority that reversal of Davis' conviction was necessary to preserve his due process rights. 127

123. Davis. 872 P.2d at 604. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII stating: "[e)xcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted."
124. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (a) (West Supp. 1995).
125. [d. at 604. Justice Kennard explained:
Under [the felony-murder) rule, even an accidental killing
committed during the perpetration of certain specifies felonies is first degree murder . . . . In some such cases a
penalty of death, or even life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole, may be wholly disproportionate to
the particular defendant's criminal culpability, and thus
may violate constitutional proscriptions against cruel and
unusual punishment.
[d.
In his dissent, Justice Mosk explained:
[A)n unarmed 18-year-old with no criminal record enters a
store during business hours, intending to shoplift a can of
spray paint; when a security guard accosts him, his nerve
fails and he bolts for the door; in his haste he accidentally knocks a woman shopper to the floor; unknown to
anyone the woman is 7 weeks' pregnant, and the trauma
of the fall causes her to miscarry.
[d. at 619. See infra notes 171-84 and accompanying text for the discussion of
Justice Mosk's dissent.
126. Davis, 872 P.2d at 604. Justice Kennard argued that life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole was not disproportionate to Davis' criminal culpability because Davis had shot his victim in the chest at point blank range as he
attempted to rob her. [d. This conduct was highly likely to result in a fatality. [d.
It was only fortuitous that Davis' conduct did not result in the victim's death in
addition to the death of her fetus. [d.
127. [d. at 603. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text for a summary
of the Davis majority's discussion of due process principles.
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VI. CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT
Justice Baxter wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion.12s Although he agreed with the majority's construction of
California's feticide statute, Justice Baxter believed Robert
Davis' conviction should not have been reversed. 129 Specifically, Justice Baxter disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
the jury instruction regarding fetal viability created an
unforeseeable judicial enlargement of the feticide statute that
would have violated Davis' due process rights. 130
Justice Baxter asserted three principal reasons in support
of his assertion that the trial court's instruction did not
unforeseeably enlarge the fetal murder statute. 131 He believed these reasons demonstrated that the definition of viability before this case was an open question in California. 132
Thus, Justice Baxter urged, Robert Davis was put on adequate
notice that the state would proscribe his conduct; he could not
credibly claim that the trial court's jury instruction

128. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 604-07 (Cal. 1994) (per Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting, joined by George, J.).
129. [d. at 604-05 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting). Baxter noted:
Had the trial court in this case given an instruction that
a fetus need not be viable under Penal Code section 187,
subdivision (a), or had the law in California been settled
that, for purposes of section 187(a), a viable fetus meant
a fetus with a "probability" or "reasonable likelihood" of
survival outside the womb, then I would not hesitate in
joining the lead opinion to reverse defendant's conviction.
[d. at 604.
130. [d. at 605. Justice Baxter noted: "In finding that this definitional instruction was in error, the lead opinion is purporting to decide an issue that was unsettled both at the time defendant acted and at the time of his trial . . . . In effect, the lead opinion wanders into a wonderland to decide what the law might be
had it not been for today's holding rejecting the viability limitation." [d.
131. See ill. First, at the time of defendant's actions, no court had directly addressed whether a viable fetus means a fetus with a possible or probable chance
of survival outside the womb. [d. Second, two courts had already expressed the
view that a viable fetus means one with a possibility of survival outside the
womb. [d. (emphasis added). Third, the California Supreme Court indicated it
would consider the suitability of an instruction implying a fetus is deemed viable
when it had a possibility of survival if and when it was faced with a case involving the viability of a fetus with less than a 50% chance of survival. [d. Thus,
Justice Baxter concluded, the definition of viability was an open ended question at
the time Robert Davis acted. [d.
132. [d.
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unforeseeably enlarged the fetal murder statute. 133 Accordingly, Justice Baxter concluded, application of the jury instruction to Robert Davis would not have abridged his due process
rights. 134
VII. DISSENT

Justice Mosk was the sole dissenter from the majority's
holding that fetal viability is not required to convict a defendant of fetal murder. Justice Mosk wrote a lengthy dissent
basing his position on five separate grounds. 135

A. THE PuRPOSE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IS TO
AsCERTAIN LEGISLATIVE INTENT

Justice Mosk began his dissent by stating that both a
statute's legislative history and the wider circumstances of its
enactment demonstrate relevant evidence of a legislature's
actual intent. l36 He explained that the legislative intent behind the amendment· of section 187(a) could be ascertained
only by understanding the defendant's actions in Keeler v.
Superior Court 137 and the supreme court's response to
them.13s Justice Mosk added: "It is black letter law that the
holding of a case is determined 'by taking into account ... the
facts treated by the judge as material, and. . . his decision
based on them.",139 Justice Mosk then pointed out that he
had authored the Keeler opinion for the court.14D
In Keeler, the defendant had intentionally killed his estranged wife's viable fetus, yet, he was acquitted of murder

133. [d. at 607.
134. Davis, 872 P.2d at 607.
135. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 607-24 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
136. [d. at 607.
137. 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
138. Davis, 872 P.2d at 608. Section 187(a) was amended immediately following
the Keeler decision in response to the legislature's outrage at that opinion. [d.
Thus, the Keeler holding sheds light on the legislature's intent behind the amendment. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of Keeler.
139. Davis, 872 P.2d at 608 (citing Achen v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 233 P.2d
74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951)).
140. [d.
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because California's murder statute did not refer to fetuses. l4l In affirming the trial court, the supreme court explained that the common law had always required a live birth
to support a charge of murder. 142
The issue before the Keeler court, Justice Mosk asserted,
was "whether an unborn but viable fetus is a 'human being'
within the meaning of section 187."143 Justice Mosk placed
great importance on the fact that the fetus in Keeler was viable
because the majority in that case repeatedly incorporated that
fact into its legal analysis and conclusions. 144 Although the
Keeler court did not deny that a fetus capable of independent
existence was viable, the court still held that the defendant
could not be prosecuted for the murder of an unborn, but viable fetus. 146 The court did not want to expand the murder
statute to an additional class of victims, reasoning that the
task was solely reserved to the legislature. 146 Furthermore,
the Keeler court noted, such an interpretation of the statute
would result in a judicial enlargement that would violate the
defendant's due process rights for lack of notice. 147
Justice Mosk additionally stressed that the dissent in Keeler ''likewise tied its analysis and conclusions closely to the fact
of viability."148 Because the dissent argued that "[t]here is no
141. See Keeler, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
142. Davis, 872 P.2d at 609 (citing Keeler, 470 P.2d at 620).
143. [d. (citing Keeler, 470 P.2d at 618) (emphasis added). The Keeler court
stressed that, at the time of the stillborn delivery, the fetus was approximately 34
112 to 36 weeks old, and the medical expert concluded with reasonable certainty
that the fetus was viable. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 619.
144. Davis, 872 P.2d at 608.
145. [d. at 618.
146. [d. The Keeler court reasoned: "For a court simply to declare, by judicial
fiat, that the time has now come to prosecute under section 187 one who kills an
unborn but viable fetus would indeed be to rewrite the statute under the guise of
construing it." [d. at 625-26.
147. Davis, 872 P.2d at 609 (citing Keeler, 470 P.2d at 630). The Keeler court
noted that it did not find any existing California case which would have given
defendant notice that the killing of an unborn, viable fetus was covered by §
187(a). Keeler, 470 P.2d at 630.
148. Davis, 872 P.2d at 609. In his dissenting opinion in Keeler, Acting Chief
Justice Burke continuously argued that a viable fetus should be considered a
human being, and therefore, included within California's murder statute. Keeler,
470 P.2d. at 630. He asserted that there is common law precedent to support the
view that a viable fetus is a human being under § 187. [d. To illustrate this
point, Justice Burke explained that the common law severely punished abortion
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good reason why a fully viable fetus should not be considered a
'human being' under [section 187]."149 Justice Mosk believed
it was "obvious" that the Keeler decision held that the legislature did not intend the killing of an "unborn, but viable" fetus
to constitute murder under section 187(a).150 According to
Justice Mosk, in rushing to amend s~ction 187(a), "the Legislature extended the crime of murder, as the Keeler court refused to do, to the malicious killing of a viable fetus. "151 He
opined: "[T]o read that amendment as further extending murder to include the killing of even a nonviable fetus, as the lead
opinion does now, is to ignore the facts and holding of Keeler
and the direct legislative response they so plainly triggered."152
B.

EIGHTEEN YEARS OF LEGISLATIVE SILENCE SIGNAL PASSIVE
,ApPROVAL OF THE FETAL VIABILITY REQUIREMENT

As a second ground for his dissent, Justice Mosk explained
that People v. Smith,l53 the first case to construe the 1970
amendment to section 187, and all subsequent cases involving
fetal murder in California, have "held or assumed that viability
is an element of the crime."154

Moreover, Justice Mosk pointed out, since Smith, the legislature had met eighteen times without taking any steps to
overrule the holding of that case. 155 According to Justice

after "quickening" and reasoned that, "we cannot assume that the legislature intended a person such as defendant, charged with the malicious slaying of a fully
viable child, to suffer only the mild penalties imposed upon common abortionists
who, ordinarily, procure only the miscarriage of a nonviable fetus or embryo." [d.
at 631 (emphasis added). Justice Burke further argued that his view "would not
judicially create a new offense because the Legislature intended that the term
'human being' in section 187 be constituted as an evolving concept defined by the
courts according to contemporary conditions." [d. at 632.
149. 872 P.2d at 610 (quoting Keeler, 470 P.2d at 634 (Cal. 1970».
150. [d.
151. [d.
152. [d.
153. 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Ct. App. 1976).
154. Davis, 872 P.2d at 610-11. Justice Mosk referred to People v. Hamilton,
774 P.2d 730 (Cal. 1989); People v. Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Ct. App. 1990);
People v. R.P. Smith, 234 Cal. Rptr. 142 (Ct. App. 1987); and People v. Apodaca,
142 Cal. Rptr. 830 (Ct. App. 1978).
155. Davis, 872 P.2d at 611. Justice Mosk recognized that Legislative silence
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Mosk, if the California Legislature had disagreed with later
judicial opinions limiting criminal liability for the killing of a
fetus to a viable fetus, it would have responded as vigorously
as it had after the Keeler u. Superior Court decision in 1970 by
once again amending the statute. 15S However, rather than
taking remedial action, the legislature has remained silent. 167
Thus, Justice Mosk concluded: "In these circumstances [the
legislature's] acquiescence is persuasive evidence of its intent."158
C.

THE MAJORITY EXAGGERATES THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
By ASSERTING THAT THE TERM "FETUS" WAS
DELIBERATELY LEFT UNDEFINED

Justice Mosk next noted that the majority opinion devoted
barely any of its discussion to the task of determining the
legislature's intent when it amended California's homicide
statute to include fetal murder. 159 He asserted that the majority opinion made a "gross exaggeration" of the legislative
history by concluding that the legislature deliberately declined
to adopt a provision that limited the section 187(a) amendment

after a court has construed a statute gives rise at most to an arguable inference
of acquiescence or passive approval and that the presumption of such acquiescence
is not conclusive in determining legislative intent. [d. at 612 (citing Harris v.
Capital Growth Investors, 805 P.2d 873 (Cal. 1991)). Nevertheless, Mosk argued
that, because the viability element of fetal murder had been recognized in a number of published opinions, approved jury instructions, and the legislature has acquiesced in that construction for 18 years, the inference of passive legislative approval was quite strong. [d.
156. Davis, 872 P.2d at 612. Mosk noted that the legislature is aware of its
power to delete added statutory elements by judicial construction. [d. at 611. To
demonstrate his point, Justice Mosk stated that in People v. Conley, 411 P.2d 911
(Cal. 1966), the California Supreme Court declared that, "[aln awareness of the
obligation to act within a general body of laws regulating society . . . is included
in the statutory definition of ... malice." [d. (citing Conley, 411 P.2d 911 (Cal.
1966». In 1981, however, the legislature expressly repudiated the Conley construction by adding a sentence to the applicable section 188 declaring: "An awareness
of the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating society is not
included within the definition of malice." Davis, 872 P.2d at 612 (quoting Stats.
1981, ch. 404, § 6, p.1593).
157. [d.
158. [d. See supra notes 113-17 for Justice Kennard's response to this argument.
159. Davis, 872 P.2d at 612. Justice Mosk asserted that the majority essentially
gave up on the task of determining legislature's intent. ld.
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to viable fetuses. l60
Justice Mosk further argued that the majority had completely misread the legislative history when it asserted that
the legislature was "clearly aware that it could have limited
the term 'fetus' to 'viable fetus,' for it specifically rejected a
proposed amendment that required the fetus to be at least
twenty weeks in gestation before the statute would apply."16l
Contrary to the majority's assertion, according to Justice Mosk,
the proposed amendment that would protect a twenty-week-old
fetus as a human being was deleted to avoid conflict with the
Therapeutic Abortion Act,162 not because of the viability issue. 163
Furthermore, Justice Mosk stated that the majority opinion erred by defining fetal murder liability at "seven or eight
weeks after fertilization."l64 Justice Mosk believed the majority was legislating on the subject and that such an imprecise interpretation was highly unlikely the legislature's intent. 165
160. Davis, 872 P.2d at 613. Justice Mosk quoted the majority as concluding:
"The legislative history of the amendment suggests the term 'fetus' was deliberately left undefined after Legislature debated whether to limit the scope of statutory application to viable fetus." 1d. (quoting Davis, 872 P.2d at 594).
Justice Mosk believed this statement wrongfully implied that the legislature
conducted a full debate on whether the section 187 amendment should be limited
to viable fetuses. 1d. In addition, Justice Mosk pointed out, the majority's support
for this conclusion consisted of only one committee member who argued that the
amendment should be expressly limited to viable fetuses. 1d. Justice Mosk argued
that this single objection was merely the personal position of one person and was
a far cry from a full scale legislative debate. Id. He concluded that it was not a
proper subject for determining the legislature's intent because it did not represent
the views of other legislative members who favored the bill. 1d.
161. 1d.
162. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-25957 (West 1984 & Supp.
1995).
163. Davis, 872 P.2d at 613. Justice Mosk stated that the language in the original version of the 1970 amendment, which states: "As used in this section, 'human
being' includes a fetus which has advanced to or beyond the 20th week of
uterogestation," had nothing to do with viability, but referred to abortion and
"quickening." 1d. Justice Mosk based his opinion on the undisputed medical fact
that fetuses are not viable at 20 weeks. Id.
164. Id. at 614. Specifically, the majority opinion concluded that the malicious
killing of a fetus under California Penal Code § 187 is murder so long as the
state can show that the fetus has progressed beyond the seven or eight week
embryonic stage. Id. (citing Davis, 872 P.2d at 602).
165. Davis, 872 P.2d at 614. Justice Mosk explained that the legislature would
never draw a line at seven or eight weeks. 1d. He analogized this Legislative im-
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He explained that a seven-week-old fetus is the size of a peanut and argued that the contrast between it and a viable fetus
is too obvious to be ignored. 166 Justice Mosk could believe
that the legislature intended the killing of a fully viable fetus
to constitute murder, yet, he could not believe the legislature
intended the definition of murder to include the killing of "an
object the size of a peanut. "167

D. WHEN THERE Is UNCERTAINTY ABOUT STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION, IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT THE
LEGISLATURE INTENDED REASONABLE RESULTS, NOT
ABSURD CONSEQUENCES

Justice Mosk argued that it was even more improbable
that the legislature intended many of the consequences resulting from the majority's new definition of "fetus" in Penal Code
section 1.87(a).168 One consequence, Justice Mosk explained, is
that a defendant can be convicted of capital murder for causing
the death of an object that no person had any reason to know
even existed. 169 Even in the present case, Justice Mosk emphasized, existing evidence suggested that Robert Davis did
not know his victim was pregnant when he robbed and shot
her. 170

preciseness to scenario of the legislature prescribing that the death penalty shall
not be imposed on any individual under the age of 17 or 18. [d.
166. [d. at 615.
167. [d. Justice Mosk described a seven week embryo as having a bulbous head
that comprises roughly half of its body, widely spread eye sockets and puglike nostrils. [d. at 614-15. Additionally, the embryo's hands and feet are still webbed and
it retains a vestigial tail. [d. at 615. Justice Mosk noted that if viewed at eight
weeks, an uninformed observer would have difficulty even recognizing it as human.
[d.
168. [d.
169. [d. Mosk stated:
A woman whose reproductive system contains an immature fetus a fraction of an inch long and weighing a fraction of an ounce does not, of course, appear pregnant. In
fact, if she is one of many women with some irregularity
in her menstrual cycle, she herself may not know she is
pregnant . . .. Unless such a woman knows she is pregnant and has disclosed that fact to the defendant, the
defendant has no way of knowing she is carrying a fetus.
[d.
170. Davis, 872 P.2d at 615. Robert Davis testified that, on the day of the
shooting, his victim, Maria Flores, did not "show" her pregnancy. [d. She was
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Justice Mosk further charged that the majority's new interpretation of the state's murder statute creates absurd consequences due to its interaction with California's felony-murder
statute.171 In the present case, lacking proof of both malice
and premeditation, the prosecutor sought a murder conviction
on the theory of felony-murder. 172 Justice Mosk pointed out
that the felony-murder theory had been invoked in only one
previous fetal murder case that did not involve the intentional
killing of a fetus. 173 Nevertheless, Justice Mosk explained,
even that case was distinguishable from the present scenario. 174
In People v. Henderson,175 the prosecutor likewise invoked the theory of felony-murder in an attempt to convict the
defendant of murder. 176 However, contrary to the Davis scenario, at the time of fetal death in Henderson, the victim's
fetus was viable, for the mother was approximately thirty
weeks pregnant. 177 Moreover, the jury in Henderson avoided
the severe results of the felony-murder rule by exercising its
"power of nullification"178 to convict the defendant of second
degree murder rather than the requisite first degree murder. 179
approximately five feet and weighed 191 pounds on the last day of her visit to her
obstetrician. [d. Furthermore, a doctor at Davis' trial testified that it was not
likely that, given Flores' height and weight, she would have showed her pregnancy
while clothed and standing up. [d.
171. [d. at 616.
172. Davis, 872 P.2d at 617.
173. [d. In People v. Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Ct. App. 1990), the felony
murder rule was invoked by the prosecutor, but the facts differ. See infra notes
175-79 and accompanying text.
174. Davis, 872 P.2d at 617.
175. 275 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Ct. App. 1990). In Henderson, the defendant robbed
and killed a married couple. [d. at 839. At the time of the murder, the wife was
pregnant with a viable 'cetus. [d. at 841.
176. [d. at 839.
177. [d. at 841. Furthermore, the defendant in Henderson was well acquainted
with the pregnant woman because he lived with her prior to murdering her and
her fetus. [d. at 842.
178. See generally People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 728 (Cal. 1983) (Kaus, J.,
concurring), for an explanation of jury nullification. Jury nullification occurs when
the jury ignores a rule or result that it considers unjust. 1d.
179. See Davis 872 P. 2d. at 617 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (saying that the jury
apparently exercised their "power of nullification" by finding defendant Philip
Henderson guilty of only second degree murder of the victim's fetus). But see
Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr.· at 839, where the jury found the defendant Velma
Henderson guilty of murder in the first degree of the same fetus. See also CAL.
PENAL CODE § 189 (West Supp. 1995). Under the felony-murder rule, a murder

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss3/5

26

Qureshi: California's Fetal Murder Statute

1995]

CALIFORNIA'S FETAL MURDER STATUTE

605

Justice Mosk asserted that the majority's new definition of
"fetus" in section 187 will create even harsher results than in
Henderson. 18o He explained that the felony-murder rule "will
be extended to include any death, in the commission of a listed
felony, of a nonviable and invisible fetus that the actor neither
knew nor had reason to know existed."181 Justice Mosk believed it unlikely that the legislature intended the 1970
amendment to section 187(a), to accomplish "so absurd a result. "182 Furthermore, he added, these unsound results could
provoke either juries to nullify convictions,183 or courts to
hold that a first degree murder conviction violates the Eighth

committed during an enumerated felony is murder in the first degree as a matter
of law.
In Henderson, the defendant, Philip Henderson, was convicted of robbery
and two counts of first degree murder for the deaths of the married couple, but
the jury only convicted him of second degree murder for the death of the fetus.
Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 839. In Justice Mosk's opinion, the Henderson jury
was doubtlessly instructed that under the felony-murder rule, the killing of the
fetus was first degree murder because it occurred during a robbery. Davis, 872
P.2d at 617 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, Justice Mosk stated that the jury
declined to follow the law given to them by the court and instead, returned a
verdict of second degree murder, thus, exercising their power of nullification. [d.
180. Davis, 872 P.2d at 617.
181. [d. at 619. Justice Mosk charged that excluding the viability element in
section 187(a) will provide draconian results in felony-murder situations. [d. at
618. In his opinion, the Davis decision would apply to the scenario where:
lAIn unarmed 18-year-old with no criminal record enters a
store during business hours, intending to shoplift a can of
spray paint; when a security guard accosts him, his nerve
fails and he bolts for the door; in his haste he accidentally knocks a woman shopper to the floor; unknown to
anyone the woman is 7 weeks' pregnant, and the trauma
of the fall causes her to miscarry.
[d. at 619. Justice Mosk explained, that prior to the majority's new interpretation,
such a youth would be guilty at most of second degree burglary, punishable by a
prison term up to three years. [d. Now, this teenager could be found guilty of first
degree murder of a fetus on a burglary felony-murder theory. [d. In that event,
his punishment would be at least 25 years to life in prison, and he could be sentenced to death. [d.
182. [d. Justice Mosk stated that, to apply felony murder to the unintentional
death of a nonviable and invisible fetus that an individual did not know existed
extends the rule beyond the purpose it was intended to serve. [d. He cited former
California Justice Traynor, in People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1965), as
stating: "The felony-murder rule has been criticized on the grounds that in almost
all cases in which it is applied it is unnecessary and that it erodes the relation
between criminal liability and moral culpability. Although it is the law in this
state, it should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to
serve." [d. (quoting Washington, 402 P.2d at 134) (citations omitted).
183. [d. at 620. See supra note 178 for a discussion of jury nullification.
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Amendment. 184
E. THE MAJORITY'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE 1970 AMENDMENT
TO PENAL CODE SECTION 187(A) WILL MAKE CALIFORNIA'S
MURDER STATUTE THE MOST SEVERE IN THE UNITED
STATES

Lastly, Justice Mosk declared, in most states, the killing of
a fetus is not homicide. 186 In fact, Mosk asserted, "it appears
that in no other state is it a capital offense to cause the death
of a nonviable and invisible fetus that the actor neither knew
nor had reason to know existed. "186
Justice Mosk's personal research discovered various jurisdictions that have enacted stattites criminalizing the killing of
a fetus, and he grouped these jurisdictions into three distinct
categories. First, in at least thirteen jurisdictions, the killing
of a fetus is not criminal unless the fetus is viable or is far beyond the gestational age of seven or eight weeks, the period
prescribed by the majority opinion. 187 Second, in at least six
184. [d. See People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1983) (holding, on the facts of
that case, that a sentence of life imprisonment for a seventeen year old youth,
who was convicted of first degree felony murder, for killing a marijuana farmer,
was cruel and unusual punishment).
185. Davis, 872 P.2d at 620.
186. [d.
187. [d. at 621. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §707.7 (West 1993) (fetal killing
after the second trimester is called "feticide"); N.Y. PENAL §125.00 (McKinney
1987) (homicide exists when the fetus is older than 24 weeks). In South Carolina
fetal murder exists when the fetus is viable. See State v. Horne, 319 S.E.2d 703,
704 (S.C. 1984) (holding that fetal murder exists when the fetus is viable); See
Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571, 575-76 (Mass. 1989) (holding that a
defendant can be convicted for the common law crime of murder where the fetus
was viable, but has not addressed the issue of whether such viability is a prerequisite to culpability). In England, a statute provides that any person who intentionally causes a fetal death commits the crime of "child destruction" provided that
the fetus was capable of being born alive. Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 1929, 19
& 20 Geo. 5, ch. 34 § 1.
In eight of these thirteen states the relevant statutes criminalize the killing
of an "unborn quick child." See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 1992); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-5-80 (1992); MICH. COMPo LAwS ANN. § 750.322 (West 1991); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.210 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
TIT. 21, § 713 (WEST 1983); R.1. GEN LAws ANN. § 11-23-5 (1994); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 (West 1988). Justice Mosk noted that in all but one of
these eight states, fetal homicide is punished as "manslaughter"; in Georgia, he explained, it is deemed "feticide." Davis, 872 P.2d at 621.
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jurisdictions, the legislature has expressly declared that the
killing of a product of conception is criminal regardless of its
gestational age. 188 Finally, in at least six jurisdictions, the
statute is facially silent on the matter of minimum gestational
age for a conviction of fetal murder. 189
Justice Mosk pointed out that California is one of these six
states within the third category. In the other five states, however, the punishment for the offense is far less harsh than
California. l90 Even in Utah, where the state murder statute
188. [d. at 621-22. See ARIZ. REV. STAT ANN. § 13-1103 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-13-201 (Michie 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-7 (Michie 1994).
Contrary to the three states where the killing of a product of conception is
not murder, Justice Mosk stated that in Illinois, the offense is called "intentional
homicide of an unborn child." See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/9-1.2 (SmithHurd 1993). "But the statute further provides that the act is not homicide unless
the actor actually 'knew that the woman was pregnant .... [d. at subd. (a)(3). "And
the punishment for this crime 'shall be the same as for first degree murder, except
that the death penalty may not be imposed .... [d. at subd. (d) (emphasis added).
Minnesota and North Dakota label the offense as the "murder of an unborn child."
See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266, 609.2661 (West 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.117.1-01, 12.1-17.1-02 (Supp. 1993). In Minnesota the offense is first degree murder
if the actor kills the unborn child either with premeditation and "with intent to
effect the death of the unborn child or another," or while committing a listed
felony; however, the maximum punishment is life imprisonment. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.2661. In North Dakota the maximum penalty is life imprisonment. See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01 (1985).
189. Davis, 872 P.2d at 623. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 187(a) (West 1988);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (Burns 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.6 (West
Supp. 1990); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 631:1 (Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAws
ANN. § 22-17-6 (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201(1) (1990).
190. Davis, 872 P.2d at 623. Justice Mosk explained that in four of these five
states, the killing of a fetus is given special treatment and not punished as severely as in California. He stated:
Thus, in Indiana one who "knowingly or intentionally"
terminates a pregnancy commits feticide, punishable by
imprisonment for four years with a possible fine of not
more than $10,000. In Louisiana one who kills an unborn
child intentionally or in the commission of a listed felony
commits first degree feticide punishable by imprisonment
for not more than 15 years. In South Dakota one who
"intentionally kills a human fetus by causing an injury to
its mother" commits a felony punishable by imprisonment
for 10 years with a possible fine of $10,000. And in New
Hampshire one who "Purposely or knowingly causes injury
to another resulting in miscarriage or stillbirth" commits
first degree assault punishable by imprisonment for not
more than 15 years with a possible fine not to exceed
$4,000.
[d. (citations omitted). See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-1-6, 35-50-2-6 (Burns 1994);
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most closely resembles California's, the murder of a fetus is
considered a capital offense "only if the actor caused the death
of the unborn child 'intentionally or knowingly,' even in a felony-murder case."191 Justice Mosk maintained that it was
highly unlikely that the legislature intended to make
California's murder statute the most severe in the United
States. 192
F.

REMAND FOR A NEW TRIAL WOULD BE FuTILE

Justice Mosk concluded his dissent by arguing that a retrial on the murder count would be a "total waste of court time,
prosecutorial resources and taxpayers' money. "193 He explained that, if a retrial occurred, the prosecution would be
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Flores' fetus
was viable and that survival was probable rather than possible. 194 Justice Mosk believed that this task would be futile
because "none of the medical experts who testified at [Robert
Davis'] trial believed that the fetus had a 'probable' chance of
survival. "195 He asserted that the prosecution had taken "its
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.6 (West Supp. 1990); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 631:1,
subd. I(c), 651:2 (Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 22·17-6, 22-6-1 (1988).
191. [d. (emphasis added). See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201(1) (1990). The statute reads:
(a) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or
acting with a mental state otherwise specified in the
statute defining the offense, causes the death of another
human being, including an unborn child.
(b) There shall be no cause of action for criminal homicide against a mother or a physician for the death of an
unborn child caused by an abortion.
[d.
192. Davis, 872 P.2d at 623. Justice Mosk stated:
I cannot believe that in amending section 187 to make
that act a crime the Legislature also intended to make
California the only state in the Union in which it is a
capital offense to cause the death of a nonviable and
invisible fetus that the actor neither knew nor had reason
to know existed. Yet this, again, is where the lead
opinion's construction of the 1970 amendment inexorably
takes us. I dissent from that construction.
[d.
193. [d. at 624.
194. Davis, 872 P.2d at 624. The prosecution would have to prove that the
fetuB had greater than a 50% chance of survival outside the mother's womb. [d.
195. [d. (quoting Davis, 872 P.2d at 602). The prosecution called three physi-
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best shot" at proving viability beyond a reasonable doubt, but
could not successfully do SO.196 Thus, Justice Mosk opined, it
would be highly improbable that the prosecution could establish a better case for viability in a retrial, "let alone prove that
element beyond a reasonable doubt."197
VIII. CRITIQUE

A. THE LEGISLATURE ONLY INTENDED VIABLE FETUSES TO BE
COVERED BY ITS 1970 AMENDMENT
The author agrees with the dissent that the legislature did
not deliberately intend to exclude the term "viable" from the
1970 amendment of California Penal Code section 187(a).198
The Davis majority failed to offer any substantial evidence
demonstrating the legislature's intent to purposely omit the
term "viable" from the statute. Justice Mosk, to the contrary,
correctly pointed out that the 1970 amendment to section 187
was enacted in direct and emphatic response to the California
Supreme Court's holding in Keeler v. Superior Court. 199 The
legislature hastily amended the statute to express its outrage
at a judicial opinion that permitted a man who intentionally
killed the viable fetus of his former wife to escape criminal
culpability.20o
B.

LEGISLATIVE SILENCE DOES NOTE SIGNAL ACQUIESCENCE

In his dissent, Justice Mosk demonstrated that the
legislature's initial intention was to include only viable fetuses
within California's murder statute. 201 Nevertheless, the aucians who were all experts in fetal viability and not a single physician believed
that Flores' fetus "probably" would have survived outside its mother's womb. [d.
196. [d.
197. [d. Justice Mosk explained that the facts and medical testimony would not
change in a retrial. [d. Thus, there would be no reason to compel the physicians
to repeat their tedious testimony or to put the victim and her family through this
tragic event once again. [d.
198. See People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 607-15, (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
.
199. See id. at 607-10. See Keeler, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
200. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 610. See supra notes 137-52 and accompanying text
for a summary of Justice Mosk's discussion regarding Keeler.
201. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 607-10.
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thor believes that Justice Mosk was mistaken in his assertion
that the legislature acquiesced in eighteen years of appellate
court holdings requiring viability for fetal murder because the
legislature agreed with the interpretation of those courts. 202
Justice Kennard, in her concurrence, was correct in pointing
out that the legislature was powerless to delete the judicially
imposed viability requirement of section 187 due to the constitutional mandate set by prior appellate court decisions. 203
Thus, the fact that the legislature had not responded to these
subsequent appellate court rulings by once again amending the
statute did not demonstrate its agreement with these courts'
interpretations. 204 Because the courts' relied on Roe v. Wade
in imposing the viability requirement, whether or not the legislature agreed with their holdings, its silence signaled nothing
more that its acquiescence in those courts' interpretation of the
United States Constitution. 205
Regardless of the correct statutory interpretation, now
that the California Supreme Court has drawn its own conclusion regarding the legislature's intent and ruled that viability
is no longer a requirement for fetal murder, the court has
provided the legislature the perfect opportunity to clarify its
actual intent.
C.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1.

California Should Enact a Separate Feticide Statute

The California Legislature should enact a separate statute
to punish the killing of a fetus. Separating feticide from homicide would eliminate the turmoil that is caused by the categorization of both offenses within California's general murder
statute. 206 Most states do not criminalize the killing of a fetus
in the same statute that criminalizes "homicide."207 Instead,

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
TIMES,
207.

See Davis, 872 P.2d at 603 (Kennard, J., concurring).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Maura Dolan, Assault Causing Miscarriage Can Be Murder, L.A.
May 17, 1994, at AI.
See Davis, 872 P.2d at 620 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Trudell,
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these states statutorily distinguish between the two
offenses. 208 For example, in Indiana one who knowingly or
intentionally terminates a pregnancy commits "feticide."209
One who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being, by contrast, commits "murder.,,21o
By criminalizing the killing of a fetus under a feticide
statute rather than under a more general murder statute, the
legislature would help diffuse the controversy that abortion
activists have breathed into this issue. 211 A separate feticide
statute would recognize the perpetual state interest in protecting the "potentiality of life" by permitting punishment of an
actor who intentionally terminates a fetus.212

2.

Punishment Should Result Only Where Knowledge and
Intent Are Present, Regardless of Fetal Viability

Furthermore, the separate feticide statute should punish
the intentional killing of a fetus regardless of viability.
Criminals who knowingly and intentionally terminate a
woman's fetus at any gestational age would be deemed to have
committed feticide. They could face up to life imprisonment
due to the state's interests in protecting the potentiality of life
and punishing violent conduct that deprives a woman of her
choice to have a child.213 In this same situation, however, the
death penalty would be too harsh because the termination of a
fetus is not the taking of a "human life.,,214

3.

The Felony-Murder Rule Should Not Apply
Lastly, California's felony-murder rule 215 would not apply

755 P.2d 511, 515 (Kan. 1988)).
208. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (Burns 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:32.6 (West Supp. 1995).
209. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6.
210. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-1 (Burns 1994).
211. See Dolan, supra note 206 (stating that anti-abortion advocates hail this
decision as giving new rights to an unborn child).
212. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 599.
213. See id. at 604 (Kennard, J., concurring).
214. See People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502 (Ct. App. 1976).
215. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West Supp. 1995). Under the felony-murder
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to the recommended feticide statute when the killing of a fetus
is unintentional and without the person's knowledge that a
fetus exists. 21s Chief Justice Traynor's opinion in People v.
Washington,217 echoed by Justice Mosk in his Davis dissent,
correctly pointed out that the application of the felony-murder
doctrine erodes the relation between criminal liability and
moral culpability.218 Thus, the doctrine should not be "extended beyond any rational function· it was designed to
serve.,,219
Clearly, where a perpetrator· acts with knowledge and
intent, it is rational to punish the actor for his or her purposefully violent conduct. However, where one kills a fetus unintentionally and without knowledge of its existence, the application of the felony-murder rule to punish a defendant extends
the rule beyond any rational function it was designed to
serve. 220 The California Legislature adopted the felony-murder rule in 1872,221 whereas the killing of a fetus was not
criminally proscribed until 1970. 222 Thus, when it chose to
criminalize unintentional killings that occur during the commission of certain enumerated felonies, the California Legislature could not have envisioned that this statute would one day
apply to fetuses. The application of the felony-murder rule in
this instance would not only create unjust decisions, but would
create irrational and undeserving punishments as well. 223

rule, a murder committed during a listed felony is murder in the first degree as a
matter of law. [d.
216. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (Burns 1994).
217. 402 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1965).
218. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 619 (citing People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130
(Cal. 1965).
219. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 619 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington, 402
P.2d 130).
220. See id. (citing People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1965)).
221. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988).
222. See Stats. 1970, ch. 1311, § I, p. 2440.
223. See Davis, 872 P.2d at 619 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Under the recommended
statute, the defendant in Davis, would not be convicted for either feticide or felony
murder.
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IX. CONCLUSION
In People v. Davis,224 the California Supreme Court held
that the viability of a fetus is not a required element of fetal
murder under California Penal Code section 187(a).226 The
court first explained why Roe v. Wade principles do not apply
to the non-consensual third-party killing of a woman's fetuS. 226 Next, the Davis court analogized California to other
states where viability is not a requirement for fetal murder
and used this analogy to illustrate why such a statute is not
unconstitutional. 227

Although the supreme court held that viability is unnecessary to convict a defendant of fetal murder, it determined that
its new statutory interpretation judicially enlarged the statute
and would violate Robert Davis' due process rights if applied to
him. 228 Consequently, the court applied the former interpretation of the statute. Since Davis had been prejudiced by the
trial court's incorrect jury instruction pertaining to the former
interpretation, the court reversed and remanded the Davis
case for a new trial. 229
The Davis court's new interpretation of section 187(a)
threatens to have a bearing on abortion rights because the
opinion has been interpreted by abortion activists as implicitly
determining "when life begins" as well as giving the fetus
rights independent of the mother. 230 Consequently, many
"pro-life" advocates have interpreted the Davis decision as precedent for asserting that human life begins at conception and
deserves separate, individual rights. These pro-life advocates
consider Davis a victory for their cause, for they believe that

224. 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994).
225. [d. at 593.
226. [d. at 597. The Davis court explained that the state has an interest in
protecting the "potentiality of life," and a court may recognize an unborn fetus'
interests in situations where these interests do not conflict with a mother's right
to personal autonomy. [d.
227. See id. at 598·600.
228. Davis, 872 P.2d at 600.
229. [d. at 600.
230. See Maura Dolan, Assault Causing Miscarriage Can Be Murder, L.A.
TIMES, May 17, 1994, at AI.
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the Davis decision is an official recognition that a fetus is a
human life at any stage of development. 231 Some "pro-choice"
advocates, to the contrary, have expressed disagreement with a
law that treats the fetus as a victim i:J1dependent of the mother.232 They fear that this ruling could pave the way for other
legislation regulating the behavior of pregnant women.233
These pro-choice advocates argue that lawmakers may eventually attempt to punish pregnant women for behavior, such as
smoking and drinking, which is injurious to their fetuses. 234
Whether or not these divergent viewpoints are warranted, the
People v. Davis holding has set a controversial precedent that
adds fuel to the fire of an already heated and passionate abortion debate.
Julie N. Qureshi'

231. 1d.
232. See id.
233. 1d.
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